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Ioannis Ziogas
Love Elegy and Legal Language in Ovid
Summary: Ovid’s engagement with legal discourse is a version of the elegiac rec-
usatio, a simultaneous appropriation and denial of legalisms. Set against the
background of Augustus’ adultery laws, Ovidian elegy aspires to dictate and re-
form the rules of amatory conduct. The Ars Amatoria exemplifies the profile of
love elegy as legal discourse by attempting to regulate love affairs under a re-
gime that institutionalized passion. The conflict and interaction between the
world of elegiac seduction and that of Roman law feature prominently in Acon-
tius’ letter to Cydippe (Heroides 20). In this letter, literary sources legitimize po-
etic imitations; fanciful innovations mirror established traditions; wedding con-
tracts converge with amatory deception and witness-statements with love letters.
By construing an intricate nexus between the fantasies of desire and the reality
and materiality of legal documents, Ovid suggests that, in the end, Cupid is in
charge of both the letter and the spirit of the law.
Keywords: elegy; law; recusatio; adultery; marriage; love letter; materiality; wit-
ness-statements; magic; seduction
Elegiac Denial and Legal Commitment
Latin love elegy is a literary genre that defines itself by denial. The so-called rec-
usatio, the disavowal of epic war for the sake of love, shapes the profile and
agenda of elegiac discourse. Yet this denial is simultaneously an appropriation.¹
Roman elegy may apparently refuse to engage with the world of wars and men,
but actually enlists martial epic in the service of love poetry. Elegy’s strategy is
more aggressive than it looks at first sight; the genre conquers by feigning a re-
treat and transforms epic narratives into elegiac metaphors.² From that perspec-
tive, elegy is more imperialistic than epic since it expands by dividing and con-
quering the martial and amatory aspects of epic poems. The denial of an active
military and political life is a powerful political statement. By refusing actively to
 Hinds () – discusses Latin poets’ simultaneous appropriation and denial in the
rather different context of the so-called primus motif.
 E.g., the motif of militia amoris. On this elegiac motif and its ironies, see Gale (); Drink-
water ().
take part in Roman imperialism, the Roman elegists make a revolutionary poetic
and political choice. Elegy’s action is its pretense of inaction.
A similar combination of denial and appropriation applies to elegy’s stance
towards Roman law. The elegiac motif of seruitium amoris is not only a reworking
of epic imagery for elegiac purposes, but also a legal concept that is employed as
poetic metaphor.³ In the manner of the traditional recusatio, Propertius reassures
Cynthia that Roman laws and Jovian weapons are incapable of separating ele-
giac lovers (2.7.1–6).⁴ Ovid’s decision to abandon a career in law for the sake
of a career in poetry is another twist of the recusatio.⁵ The exiled poet implies
that courtroom rhetoric is reprocessed for poetic effects.⁶ Ovid’s autobiographi-
cal poem (Tristia 4.10), in which he contrasts his brother’s inclination for legal
studies with his own poetic pursuits, is a case in point:
frater ad eloquium uiridi tendebat ab aeuo,
fortia uerbosi natus ad arma fori;
at mihi iam puero caelestia sacra placebant,
inque suum furtim Musa trahebat opus.
Tristia 4.10.17–20
My brother inclined towards oratory from his tender age, born for the strong weapons of the
garrulous forum; but I even as a boy delighted in heavenly rites and stealthily the Muse was
pulling me into her dear work.⁷
The forensic eloquence required for a legal career is cast in epic language; the
strong weapons (fortia arma), an unmistakable symbol of martial epic, are en-
meshed with the busy verbosity of the forum. Ovid denied this wordy and world-
ly career for the divine pleasures of poetry. His reference to his boyhood not only
suggests his affinities with the puer Cupid, but also alludes to the boyish nature
of Ovidian and Callimachean poetics with its schoolboy frivolity which pointedly
punctures the manly grauitas of epic.⁸ By contrast, his brother’s green age subtly
puns on his latent manhood (VIRidi…ab aeuo), ready to take up strong weapons.
The juxtaposition of Ovid and his brother is a version of the elegiac recusatio.The
 See Kenney () –, for seruitium amoris; cf. Kenney () ; Gebhardt ()
–.
 On recusatio in Propertius ., see Cairns () .
 Ovid models his poetic career on Vergil and his literary aspirations replace the public cursus
honorum; see Farrell (); (); Barchiesi and Hardie () –.
 Recent scholarship has focused on legal diction in Ovid’s exile poetry; see Lowrie ()
–; McGowan () –; Gebhardt () –.
 Translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.
 On this topic, see Morgan ().
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priority of pleasure (placebant), the attraction to the female Muse, and the steal-
thy work (furtim) of the Muse’s divine seduction all point to main preoccupations
of Roman love elegy. The lure of amatory poetry is more persuasive than the
noisy rhetoric of forensic litigations.
When his father admonishes him to try more profitable pursuits, Ovid at-
tempts to abandon the realm of poetry and write prose. But whatever he tried
to write would turn into verse on its own accord (Tristia 4.10.21–6). This is the
common interpretation of sponte sua carmen numeros ueniebat in aptos (‘of
its own accord a poem would come upon suitable meter’, Tristia 4.10.25), a
line which, in this context, draws attention to the poetic and legal meaning of
carmen. While forsaking a public career for the sake of poetry, Ovid pointedly
uses carmen, a word that not only refers to verse as opposed to prose, but is
also closely associated with legal and authoritative statements.⁹ Ovid’s prosaic
and futile attempts to engage with public administration end up in verse.
Thus, the transformation of Ovid’s prose into poetry is simultaneously a denial
and an appropriation of legal diction. Ovid did not simply refuse forensic
speech; instead legal discourse magically and spontaneously morphed into po-
etry. The word carmen, which is equally applicable to legal and poetic diction,
remains the same, but its form changes. True to the spirit of his Metamorphoses,
Ovid’s carmen shifts shape while its nature continues to be essentially
unchangeable.¹⁰ The poet manages both to disavow and highlight the legal na-
ture of his poetry.
The Word of the Law
Poetry builds its own imperial program and passes its own laws. The overlap be-
tween the politics of poetry and the poetics of empire that features so prominent-
ly in Augustan poetry¹¹ is partly enabled by the Latin language, which uses
words and phrases that apply both to poetic and imperial authority. Recent
scholarship, for instance, suggests that the verb cano has little, if anything, to
 See Putnam () –; Lowrie ()  notes that carmen is used to refer both to po-
etry and law. The semantic range of the Greek νόμος (‘melody’ and ‘law’) corresponds to the
Latin carmen (‘song’ and ‘law’). Svenbro () –, – argues that in Greece the
law was originally sung out by the law-chanter. More on carmen below.
 Metamorphosis often highlights continuity rather than change. Feldherr ()  points
out that human beings who undergo metamorphosis do not lose the enduring aspects of their
being, rather they take on a form that reveals them; cf. Anderson () –.
 See Hardie (); Lowrie (); Feldherr ().
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do with a distinction between singing and speaking. Instead, canere seems to de-
scribe a statement that carries authority independent of external ratification.¹²
Similarly, carmen describes powerful language that can bring about a physical
reaction that reifies the speaker’s wishes.¹³ Carmen can refer to law and by reg-
ularizing carmen as a word for a poem the Augustan poets claim a quasi-legal
status for their poems. Augustan poetry appropriates legal discourse, and
Ovid’s Ars Amatoria is probably the best example of the rivalry between Augus-
tus’ and Ovid’s carmina.
Ovid composed his Ars Amatoria against the background of Augustus’ lex
Iulia de adulteriis coercendis, which made adultery a criminal offense. In spite
of or maybe because of Ovid’s conceited statements that his love lessons do
not break the law (see, e.g., Ars Amatoria 1.31–4, 2.599–600, 3.57–8; Tristia
2.247–50), the Ars Amatoria was presumably one of the reasons why the emperor
relegated Ovid to Tomis. The accusation was that Ovid’s didactic poem teaches
adultery, which is illegal under the lex Iulia. Some scholars, such as Mario
Labate,¹⁴ argue that Ovid’s Ars does not really go against Augustus’ legislation,
but this seems to be a minority view, especially in Anglophone scholarship. Most
critics now focus on Ovid’s playfully subversive diction and some argue that his
Ars Amatoria clearly breaks Augustus’ adultery laws.¹⁵
In my view, the Ars is a politically provocative work not only because it
transgresses the boundaries of Roman law, but mainly because it presents itself
as an authoritative document that sets the rules on a subject that is legally pre-
scribed by the new regime. Poems and shows that involve obscenity and adultery
may not be per se subversive. In his defense of the Ars, Ovid points out that mar-
riageable girls and married women regularly watch obscene adultery mimes and
there has never been any problem with it (Tristia 2.497–506).¹⁶ Why would Au-
gustus mind his Ars Amatoria? Alison Sharrock responds that obscenity is not
politically sensitive: rather it is the undermining of authority which might be
so.¹⁷ An adultery mime may show characters breaking the law but this is differ-
 See references in Lowrie () –, –.
 Putnam () . See also Habinek ().
 Labate ().
 Davis (). On the Ars Amatoria and Augustus’ adultery laws, see Wallace-Hadrill ();
Gibson () –; Davis () –; Lowrie () –. On the adultery laws, see
Raditsa (); Treggiari () –, –; McGinn () –.
 Admittedly, this might be a subversive thing to say.
 Sharrock () . She further argues that after Vergil politicized didactic poetry with his
Georgics, it is impossible to read Ovid’s Ars Amatoria as apolitical, especially since it repeatedly
subverts Vergil. In my view, didactic poetry has been deeply political since Hesiod.
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ent from challenging the validity of the law or defining legal boundaries. And
Ovid’s Ars does undermine Augustus’ authority because the praeceptor assumes
the pose of a legislator who dictates the legal code which should govern love af-
fairs. Ovid and Augustus compete for control over the highly disputed and con-
troversial area of extra-marital sex.
The Ars opens with a couplet that seeks to establish the poet’s authority as
the praeceptor addresses any Romans who may need instruction in love:
Si quis in hoc artem populo non nouit amandi,
hoc legat et lecto carmine doctus amet.
Ars Amatoria 1.1–2
If there is anyone in this nation who does not know the art of loving, let him read this poem
and by reading it let him fall in love as a learned man.
Ovid’s diction suggests the beginning of a rhetorical speech and thus the poem
begins with bringing together the art of loving and the art of speaking.¹⁸ The ad-
dress to the Roman people is characteristic of rhetorical discourse and the prae-
ceptor assumes right from the beginning a Ciceronian pose. The first words
strongly suggest the opening of a Ciceronian speech.¹⁹ In the Pro Caelio, for in-
stance, Cicero imagines a certain stranger who might be ignorant of Roman law:
Si quis, iudices, forte nunc adsit ignarus legum…miretur profecto (‘If someone ig-
norant of our laws, jurors, were by chance now to be present…he would certainly
be surprised’, Pro Caelio 1.1). The relevance of the Pro Caelio for the Ars Amatoria
has not been studied, as far as I know, but it is certainly worth examining given
that both works are preoccupied with the legal aspect of extra-marital affairs.²⁰
Cicero and Ovid start with the hypothesis of an ignorant man and proceed to in-
struct this imaginary person. Ignorance commonly compels poets to write didac-
tic poetry, but rendering the jurors open to teaching is also a distinctive charac-
 Ovid’s didactic poem repeatedly draws a parallel between ars amandi and ars orandi, and its
title, Ars Amatoria, puns on Ars Oratoria.
 Several of Cicero’s speeches start with si quis: see Pro Caelio .; Diuinatio in Q. Caecilium
.; Pro Sestio .; de Prouinciis Consularibus .; Pro Rabirio Postumo .; cf. the highly rhet-
orical opening of the prologue in Terence’s Eunuchus –. Cicero opens his Pro Caelio like a Ter-
entian prologue and it has been argued convincingly that comedy plays a crucial role in this
speech; see Geffcken (); Leigh (). The comic plot of erotic deception is also central
to Ovid’s Ars Amatoria. Ovid opens his Remedia Amoris with an exordium of similar diction
(see Remedia Amoris –).
 Overall, the influence of Cicero on the Ars Amatoria has been by and large ignored. Gibson
() –, –, –, a study of the importance of Cicero’s De officiis in the Ars Amato-
ria, is an exception.
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teristic of the rhetorical exordium.²¹ In Cicero, the hypothetical foreigner would
be surprised at the peculiarity of a law which ordered that certain cases had to
be tried even on public holidays²² and Plato employs a similar hypothesis in
order to provide critique in the Laws.²³ Thus, Ovid not only assumes the pose
of an orator beginning his speech, but opens his work with a rhetorical exordium
that implies instruction on legal issues.
Advice on love affairs under Augustus is legally fraught and Ovid’s instruc-
tions are inevitably entangled with legal statements. The opening couplet evokes
an authoritative declaration. A condition marked by si quis in the protasis and
the imperative or the jussive subjunctive in the apodosis is a distinctive stylistic
feature of legal tabulae.²⁴ Thus, the jussive subjunctives (legat, amet) in the apo-
dosis of the protasis si…non nouit suggest the authority of legal carmina.²⁵ The
opening couplet of the Ars performs a speech act structured like a legal state-
ment; the participial resumption hoc legat et lecto carmine conveys the rapidity
and efficiency with which reading and the practical application of what is read
merge together. Ovid’s carmen defines the socio-political dynamics of love af-
fairs, and its performative aspect –which breaks the boundaries between reading
and doing– endows it with legal power.²⁶ This is the very nature of a carmen; a
carmen is powerful language that changes the physical world and both carmen
and legere are closely associated with legal discourse.²⁷ The etymological link
between legere and lex in combination with the legal connotations of carmen
 Ignorance compels a poet to write didactic poetry: see Lucretius, De Rerum Natura . (ig-
noratur enim quae sit natura animai ‘for they ignore what the nature of the soul is’); Verg. Geor-
gics . (ignaros…uiae…agrestis ‘ignorant of the rustic way’); Grattius, Cynegetica  (ignarum
perfudit lumine uolgus ‘he enlightened the ignorant multitude’). The ploy is as old as Hesiod (see
Opera et Dies –, –) and Empedocles (fr.  D-K). For the rhetorical doctrine that the
exordium should render the jurors open to teaching (dociles), see Lausberg () –;
Dyck () –.
 Cicero does not openly criticize the law but rather its application to Caelius’ case.
 Noted in Dyck () .
 See Meyer () –.
 Cf. si defexit…ferito, Livy ..; si quis…faxit…esto, ILC = CIL .; si quis…fecerit…
esto, Lex de imperio –, –; see Crawford () .–; cf. si quis aduersum ea fecerit…
iurent omnes socii, Cato, de Agri Cultura . ‘if someone has violated these rules…all the as-
sociates should take an oath’.
 On the performativity of Ovid’s legal statements in Tristia , see Lowrie () –.
Lowrie ()  notes that Ovid sets the poet and the lawmaker in contest as authors
whose writings contradict each other. She further focuses on the dynamic interaction between
Augustan poetry and Augustan law and examines the performative dynamics of literature and
law; Lowrie () –.
 See Lowrie () –, –.
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point to the oral reification of a law. Magdelain argues that lex is etymologically
related to legere because the law was read aloud in the Senate before it was rati-
fied by oath.²⁸ Along similar lines, Meyer (2004: 97– 101) examines the interac-
tion between writing, reading, and posting the law as a ‘unitary act’ for the
law’s ratification. Ovid’s first couplet performs all the procedures of senatorial
ratification. The author (auctor) writes down a legal statement (carmen), which
needs to be read by his readers in order to be sanctioned. Once this speech
act is performed, Ovid’s carmen has the power to fulfil the authoritative state-
ment that a law would carry within itself.²⁹ From the very beginning Ovid pits
his poetic diction against legislative acts.
Appropriation of legal acts for amatory purposes is not unknown before
Ovid.³⁰ In Plautus’ Asinaria 746–809, a parasite draws up a contract between
the young lover Diabolus, the courtesan Philaenium, and the procuress
Cleareta.³¹ The terms of the contract are referred to as leges and the author as
poeta (Asinaria 747–9, 809), a telling conflation of legal and poetic authority.
The etymological figure leges pellege (Asinaria 747) evokes the style of a carmen
and suggests that a law is put into effect by being read aloud.³² The parasite’s
contract contains conditional sentences typical of legal language: ‘If the girl
has looked at another man, she should become blind on the spot’ (si quem
alium aspexit, caeca continuo siet. Asinaria 770).³³ At this point, legal and mag-
ical language merge together.³⁴ Appropriately, the word carmen refers to laws
and incantations since both legal and magical words are powerful speech acts
with punitive force. The parasite’s curse is both a magic spell and a legal state-
 Magdelain () –. Svenbro () – argues that a similar connection be-
tween reading and the law applies in Greek. For Svenbro, νόμος (‘law’) is etymologized from
νέμω (‘I read’, not just ‘I distribute’) and Greek culture developed a conception of law insepa-
rable from its conception of reading.
 Cf. Lowrie () , citing Pierre ().
 See Meyer () –, a discussion of parodies of legal language.
 Meyer ()  points out the legal language and style of the parasite’s contract. See also
Cynthia’s formula legis in Propertius ..–.
 Etymological figures are a distinctive characteristic of legal style (cf. dedit dono, Asinaria
, nomen nominet, Asinaria ). For figura etymologica as a stylistic element of carmina,
see Meyer () , .
 Cf. et si qua inutilis/ pictura sit, eam uendat, Asinaria – ‘if there is any useless picture,
she should sell it’; si magis religiosa fuerit,/ tibi dicat, Asinaria – ‘if she is further obliged
by religion, she should tell you’; si dixerit,/ haec multa ei esto, Asinaria – ‘if she has said,
let this be her punishment’; si…dixerit,/…reddat, – ‘if she said… she should give’.
 Magical spells were treated as an extension of or substitute for courtroom rhetorical efforts
and legal punishment in Athens; see Allen () –.
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ment that binds Philaenium to a monogamous affair with Diabolus. The comic
contract takes on added meaning if we take into account that prostitutes used
their charms to seduce lovers and bawds routinely resorted to magic spells.³⁵
The parasite’s contract usurps this power from Philaenium and Cleareta and
turns it against them.
To some extent, the praeceptor of the Ars also usurps the magical power of
the bawd and employs her erotodidactic discourse.³⁶ Ovid’s hoc legat et lecto car-
mine doctus amet (Ars Amatoria 1.2) combines the legal and magical power of
reciting a carmen. Since the reading of Ovid’s poem will transform the readers
and turn them into learned lovers, the ablative absolute (lecto carmine) functions
as an ablative of means and thus Ovid’s students will fall in love by reading his
fascinating poem. The Ars Amatoria is a charming poem and an authoritative law
and the reading of such a work is a speech act that validates its contents and
casts a spell on its readers.
The Letter of the Law: Acontius and Cydippe
The motif of falling in love by reading features prominently in Latin poetry. Ca-
tullus, for instance, tells us that a certain girl was consumed by the fires of pas-
sion after reading Caecilius’ forthcoming epyllion, the Magna Mater (35.13–15).
The myth of Acontius and Cydippe is also a case in point. Cydippe is bound to
marry Acontius after she reads the hero’s message, which is inscribed on an
apple, and inadvertently swears to marry none other than Acontius (see Callima-
chus, Aetia fr. 75.23–7 Pf.). But there is more to the myth than a cheeky trick.
Cydippe virtually falls in love by reading Acontius’ words. Hardie argues that
Ovid’s Acontius redirects his message with his elegiac epistle (Heroides 20); he
further examines the magical power of the apple and its message and notes that
the repetition of the inscription on the apple in the epistle lends to the latter something of
the magical power of the oath to act at a distance, to produce effects in the physical world
through the insubstantial tokens of words spoken or written, and ultimately to bring togeth-
er the lovers in physical presence.³⁷
 The lena Dipsas, for instance, is an expert in magic spells; see illa magas artes Aeaeaque
carmina nouit, Ov. Amores .. ‘She knows magical arts and Aeaean spells’. See McKeown
() ad ..– for further examples of lenae and prostitutes with magical powers.
 See Gibson () –, –, –; cf. Fear ().
 Hardie () .
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Acontius’ message is a carmen, a magical speech act that causes Cydippe’s phys-
ical lovesickness. Interestingly, Acontius’ letter repeatedly employs the language
of law.³⁸ For Acontius, Cydippe is legally bound to marry him after reading his
message. The hero dresses up Cydippe’s involuntary oath in legal terms: she is
his res (Heroides 20.150) in the legal meaning of ‘chattel’, and her reading result-
ed in a pactum (Heroides 20.151, 155).³⁹ In objectifying Cydippe, Acontius em-
ploys the legal language that describes a slave (res) and thus the elegiac poet
gives another twist to the legalistic motif of seruitium amoris; the hero’s alluring
inscription makes the heroine the slave of his desire. Magic spells become the
basis of legal claims and the reading of love poetry is the cause of erotic passion.
The recitation of charming verses is essentially a legal action.⁴⁰
Acontius’ expertise in law seems to be Ovid’s innovation.⁴¹ In Callimachus,
Eros taught Acontius the art of winning over Cydippe, a variation of the motif of
Eros as a teacher of love poetry:⁴²
Αὐτὸς Ἔρως ἐδίδαξεν A᾿κόντιον, ὁππότε καλῇ
ᾔθετο Κυδίππῃ παῖς ἐπὶ παρθενικῇ,
τέχνην – οὐ γὰρ ὅγ’ ἔσκε πολύκροτος – ὄφρα λέγο..[
τοῦτο διὰ ζωῆς οὔνομα κουρίδιον.
Callimachus, Aetia fr. 67.1–4 Pf.
Eros himself taught Acontius the art when the boy was burning for the beautiful maiden
Cydippe – for he was not cunning – so that he might gain the name of husband for the
rest of his life.
 See Kenney (); Videau (); Alekou () –.
 See Kenney () –; Alekou () –, –.
 Acontius’ letter exemplifies Goodrich’s thesis, that the love letter is both more than law and
in breach of law; see Goodrich (). For Goodrich, the love letter expresses the priority of de-
sire over duty, of freedom of choice over marital subjection, of feminine autonomy over property
interest. The political project of the love letter is aimed at nothing less than the subversion or
transformation of institutions as spaces of relationship.Whether it supplements current legisla-
tion or violates it, the love letter is fundamentally a legal action– in fact, Goodrich argues, it is
the original legal discourse that still survives in the affectivity of the legal subconscious.
 See Kenney () –. Cydippe’s legal voice is also Ovid’s innovation. Stella Alekou
(per litteras) points out that Ovid enriches Callimachus’ polypaideia on history, medicine etc.
with legal nuances.
 See ποιητὴν δ’ἄρα Ἔρως διδάσκει, κἂν ἄμουσος ᾖ τὸ πρὶν, Euripides, Stheneboea fr. 
Nauck ‘but Eros instructs a poet then, even though he was songless before’; οἱ γὰρ Ἔρωτες ποι-
ητὰς πολλοὺς ἐδίδαξαν τοὺς πρὶν ἀμούσους, Theocritus, SH  ‘for the Erotes taught many
poets who were songless before’; see also Plato, Symposium d.
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Erotic desire turns inexperienced boys into resourceful lovers. Ovid’s Acontius is
aware of this conceit when he writes to Cydippe that even though he is not nat-
urally cunning, she makes him an expert.⁴³ Cydippe seems to have replaced the
anthropomorphic Eros of the Aetia, but Ovid’s rational interpretation of erotic
desire is followed by a distinctly anthropomorphic Amor, who gives Acontius
legal advice:⁴⁴
te mihi conpositis (siquid tamen egimus) a se
adstrinxit uerbis ingeniosus Amor.
dictatis ab eo feci sponsalia uerbis,
consultoque fui iuris Amore uafer.
Heroides 20.27–30
If indeed we played any part in the matter, ingenious Love joined you to me with words that
he contrived. I made the betrothal with words he dictated and I became cunning in the law
since Amor was my counselor.
Acontius takes legal advice from Amor, a counselor learned in the law who pre-
pares his client for appearance in court.⁴⁵ The passage is rife with legal diction:
adstringo refers to the language of a binding oath, the κατάδεσμος of Greek love
charms,⁴⁶ but it can also mean ‘to bind by laws or promises’ (OLD s.v. 8); the pro-
saic and legalistic ab eo feci sponsalia conveys the formal tone of Amor’s dicta-
tion of the act of betrothal;⁴⁷ iuris ingeniously applies both to Acontius, who be-
comes cunning in law (iuris…uafer), and Amor, who is Acontius’ jurisconsult
(consulto…iuris).⁴⁸ Ovid builds on Amor’s traditional role as a teacher of love
and love poetry, and adds a legal dimension to this motif. In Heroides 20,
Amor’s dictation of an elegiac message is indistinguishable from his legal in-
structions since elegiac discourse has the power of making and enacting a
contract.⁴⁹ Cydippe is legally bound by what she reads, but also falls in love
 non ego natura nec sum tam callidus usu; /sollertem tu me, crede, puella, facis. Heroides
.– “I am that cunning neither by inclination nor by practice; you, trust me, girl, make
me wily” alludes to and rationalizes Ἔρως ἐδίδαξεν A᾿κόντιον… τέχνην – οὐ γὰρ ὅγ’ ἔσκε πολύ-
κροτος, Callimachus, Aetia fr. .– Pf.
 On Amor as both a god and desire or a god who is Desire, see Hardie () –.
 “Ovid makes Acontius say that he has taken the best professional advice: the picture is that
of a consultation, with Cupid as counsel learned in the law, sending his client away well primed
for his appearance in court.” Kenney () .
 See Barchiesi () ; Rosenmeyer () .
 Acontius’ ‘I made a betrothal’ is provocative, given that two parties were necessary for a be-
trothal; see Kenney () ad loc.
 See Kenney () ad loc.
 On elegiac love as contract, see Gebhardt () –.
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by reading Acontius’ seductive message. Amor dictates the laws of erotic persua-
sion and the legal details of a nuptial contract.⁵⁰
Acontius’ amatory missive is reminiscent of a sponsio (an oral betrothal) or a
stipulatio (an oral contract). The verb spondeo is used in the contractual formula
of the stipulatio/ sponsio; it means ‘I give a pledge’ to do something in general or
‘I give a pledge to give in marriage’ in particular. According to traditional Roman
law, the stipulatio was binding even if it was the result of a trick; it was a contract
of strict law (the promisor was still bound even if he had entered the contract as
a result of fraud or extortion). This was remedied by praetors around 80 BCE.⁵¹
Ovid’s Acontius takes part in a juristic dispute by claiming the validity of his oral
contract, even though it was the product of dolus. The elegiac discourse of seduc-
tion merges with Roman property and family laws. Erotic desire acquires juridi-
cal authority and tricks are the justified means for winning over the beloved.
Ovid manages to add a legal dimension to Callimachus’ Aetia by alluding to
his source with the key word causa, the Latin translation of the Greek αἴτιον. A
particularly perceptive student of Cupid’s lessons in law, Acontius mischievously
complains that he is forced to plead his case in absentia:⁵²
nunc reus infelix absens agor et mea, cum sit
optima, non ullo causa tuente perit.
Heroides 20.91–2
Now I am prosecuted in my absence as an unfortunate defendant and my case, though the
best, is lost since I have no defense counsel.
Acontius’ causa is the best since it derives from Callimachus, an excellent model
for poets like Ovid. At the same time, Acontius’ legal pose recontextualizes
Ovid’s appeal to his source. The Aetia turns out to be more important than a lit-
erary model or a source for etiologies since it provides Acontius with authorita-
tive evidence that offers invaluable support to his trial (causa). Acontius bases
his case on a mythological version that comes straight out of Callimachus’
Aetia and thus expects his readers to consider his arguments truthful:
 The confluence of law and love has been the focus of recent studies in legal theory; see
Bankowski (); Goodrich ().
 See Watson () . From a different perspective, Videau (), () –, and
Alekou () –, –, argue that Acontius refers to the legal concept of dolus
bonus. Acontius asks Cydippe to summon him in order to defend himself in court (alluding to
in ius uocatio), at Heroides .–.
 Videau () and Alekou () – point out that a procedure by default was not in
iure.
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ei mihi, Cydippe, timeo tibi dicere uerum,
ne uidear causa falsa monere mea;
dicendum tamen est.
Heroides 20.107–9
Woe to me, Cydippe, I fear to tell you the truth, lest I seem to lie for my cause. However, I
should speak.
Acontius shares with Callimachus a concern about the true cause (causa/αἴτιον)
of Cydippe’s illness. The Alexandrian poet reveals that his source was Xeno-
medes, an old historian who was concerned with the truth of the tale of Acontius
and Cydippe (πρέσβυς ἐτητυμίηι μεμελημένος, fr. 75.76 Pf.).⁵³ In the Aetia, the
reason for Cydippe’s illness is given by Apollo (fr. 75.22–37 Pf.), an oracle that
solves the mystery and is a catalyst for the fulfillment of Acontius’ plan. Apollo
is proverbially a god of truth (Pindar, Pythian Odes 3.29–30, 9.42; Ovid, Ars Am-
atoria 3.789–90) and his oracle straightforwardly explains that Cydippe is bound
with an oath to marry none other than Acontius. The reason which Ovid’s Acon-
tius gives (Heroides 20.109– 16) to explain the cause of Cydippe’s illness is a ver-
sion of Callimachus’ Aetia (fr. 75.10–12, 16–37 Pf.) and that is why the hero’s
claim to truth needs to be taken seriously. A number of authoritative voices res-
onate in Acontius’ statement: Apollo, the prophet of truth, Xenomedes, the truth-
ful historian, and Callimachus, the poet of the Aetia and ultimate source of Acon-
tius’ letter. Ovid’s Acontius does not invent excuses for his own benefit (causa…
mea), but appeals to a long and authoritative tradition of history and etiology.⁵⁴
Acontius has indeed a strong case and that is what he says in his apostrophe
to his rival:
nam quod habes et tu gemini uerba altera pacti,
non erit idcirco par tua causa meae.
Heroides 20.155–6
even though you too have another agreement with identical words, your cause will not be
for that reason equal to mine.
 Commenting on Callimachus’ citation of the historian Xenomedes, Rosenmeyer () 
notes: “By pointing to these historical origins, Callimachus subtly argues for the “truth” of
his own writings. The direct reference to the historical source supports his claim to scholarly au-
thenticity, as he builds his text on the foundation of yet another text.” Historical documents con-
firm mythological truths.
 Rimell ()  notes that Ovid’s Cydippe is framed by the onus of canonical texts.
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Acontius imagines that he is settling a legal dispute with Cydippe’s fiancé.⁵⁵ They
both have identical contracts that claim the same woman, but Acontius’ causa is
superior since it originates in Callimachus’ Aetia. Ovid’s causa refers simultane-
ously to legal action and poetic tradition. Literary sources are recast as evidence
in a legal dispute and intertext becomes the trope of law within the court of el-
egiac love. As he elaborates on his claim that his causa is superior to his rival’s,
Acontius suggests a legal reform based on the laws of amatory passion. His con-
tract, he argues, is based on love and that is why it is superior to any legal com-
mitment that ignores the rules of desire.
There are several levels of correspondence in Heroides 20–21. There is the
correspondence between Acontius and Cydippe, the imaginary dispute between
Acontius and Cydippe’s fiancé, the correspondence between love elegy and
Roman law, between divine and human law, and between Ovid and his sources.
Discussing the precedence of the love letter over legal codes, Goodrich (1997: 285)
notes that the “[l]aw shares the lover’s concern with the structural significance of
originals– with authenticity and the iconic status of written expression”. Acon-
tius’ obsession with legal evidence intersects with Ovid’s love for literary
texts. Not unlike Ovid’s intertextual authentication, law is a matter of originals
because it is always bound to the inscription of prior forms. Legal writing is a
correspondence, a writing that is always a rewriting of older sources, of prece-
dents which repeat or customs which inscribe a prior, superior or divine law
(see Goodrich 1997: 286).
But the Roman law is an odd companion of elegiac persuasion. Acontius
makes sure to stress that he is seeking lawful marriage, not an illegitimate affair:
coniugium, pactamque fidem, non crimina, posco;
debitus ut coniunx, non ut adulter, amo.
Heroides 20.7–8
I seek marriage, and a loyal contract, not adultery; I love you as your destined husband,
not as a womanizer.
Despite his overall deceptive strategy, Acontius is sincere here; he actually wants
to marry Cydippe, not simply have an illicit relationship with her, and his lan-
guage creates a sharp distinction between marital bonds and extra-marital af-
fairs. Legally fraught terms polarize the loyalty of a husband and the reprehen-
sible behavior of an adulterer. On the one side of the couplet we have coniugium,
pactamque fidem, debitus coniunx, while on the other crimina and adulter. The
distinction is between following the law and breaking it, but also between ele-
 Note the transactional tone of the prosaic idcirco.
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giac passion, typically extra-marital and often described as a crimen, and conju-
gal union. Ovid’s Acontius ostensibly denies playful loves and criminal adulter-
ies for the serious commitment of wedlock. Yet his peculiar marriage contract is
attempted adultery, given that Cydippe is already engaged with another man and
bound with a betrothal that is legitimate, unlike Acontius’ shenanigans. We are
dealing with a love triangle typical of Roman elegy: Acontius is the amator who
tries to seduce a woman who belongs to another man.⁵⁶
Acontius’ language creates tensions and intersections between elegiac and
legal discourse. His formal betrothal is at odds with his elegiac passion, while
the law becomes a servant of elegiac deception. Ovid’s readers know that a lov-
er’s oaths and pledges are proverbially void⁵⁷ and that Cydippe’s involuntary
oath would have no value in Rome. Kenney (1970: 395) notes that it was a prin-
ciple of Roman law that no claim founded on dolus could stand, but Acontius
evokes the legal concept of dolus bonus⁵⁸ and the stipulatio as a stricto iure con-
tract. While the legitimacy of dolus is exceptional in the world of Roman law,
treachery and deceit rule over elegiac seduction. In fact, the words Acontius
sent to Cydippe literalize the common Latin idiom uerba dare (‘to deceive’); in
some manuscripts, Heroides 20 opens with precisely this pun (Accipe, Cydippe,
despecti nomen Aconti–/ illius in pomo qui tibi uerba dedit. Heroides 20.1a-2a ‘Re-
ceive, Cydippe, the name of scorned Acontius who deceived you/ sent you a mes-
sage on his apple’)⁵⁹ and, in her response, Cydippe plays on the literal and trans-
ferred meaning of uerbum (uerba quid exultas tua si mihi uerba dederunt…?
Heroides 21.121 ‘why do you rejoice in your words if they deceived me…?’). A mes-
sage sent to be read aloud is a pledge exacted with deception and Acontius’ law-
ful fraud both brings together and polarizes legal and elegiac carmina. In Her-
oides 20, the law has become a rhetoric of seduction, a discourse manipulated
by Amor for deceiving a beautiful woman.
To some extent, Ovid employs legal language in order to stress the weakness
of the law in the face of true passion. A rational interpretation of the myth would
suggest that a beautiful woman would be more excited about the love of a pas-
sionate young man than the prospect of an arranged marriage. Cydippe’s sick-
ness caused by her reading the apple is lovesickness; the young woman has fall-
en in love by reading Acontius’ message and suffers from the typical symptoms
 Acontius twists this and warns his rival that he is getting close to committing adultery (Her-
oides .).
 See Callimachus, Epigram ; Meleager, AP .; Catullus ; Ovid, Ars Amatoria .–.
 Videau (); () –; Alekou () –, – on the legality of dolus
bonus.
 Kenney ()  is sure that the couplet is spurious; see also Kirfel () –.
226 Ioannis Ziogas
of elegiac infatuation. The temptation of Acontius’ inscribed apple is far more
powerful than an unemotional engagement and the language of desire trumps
the technicalities of a wedding pact. Acontius’ legal claims are unconvincing,
even ludicrous, but this is the point. Ovid casts Amor as an authority on legal
issues, in order to stress that true passion is not only above the law, but also
is the law.
Cupid and Diana join forces in order to make the marriage of Acontius and
Cydippe happen. The collaboration of these antithetical divine archers who en-
able Acontius to wound Cydippe with his love missile (see Heroides 20.229–
39) is as striking as the collusion of Roman law and elegy. The hero ends his let-
ter with a fantasy; he imagines the dedication of a golden apple to Diana in imi-
tation of the original fruit, which helped him to possess Cydippe. An elegiac cou-
plet will be inscribed on a votive offering, Acontius muses, acknowledging the
authorization of the message on the original apple:
aurea ponetur mali felicis imago
causaque uersiculis scripta duobus erit:
EFFIGIE POMI TESTATUR ACONTIVS HVIVS
QUAE FVERINT IN EO SCRIPTA FVISSE RATA.
Heroides 20.237–40
A golden image of the fruitful apple will be set up and the reason will be written in two
little verses:
WITH THE LIKENESS OF THIS APPLE ACONTIUS SOLEMNLY DECLARES THAT WHAT WAS
WRITTEN ON IT HAS BEEN CERTIFIED.
The language of prayer merges with the language of law. The votive apple attests
that Acontius’ prayer to marry Cydippe or rather Cydippe’s involuntary oath to
marry Acontius was granted fulfillment (rata). At the same time, the diction is
distinctly legalistic. The phrase testatur Acontius evokes the language of a testa-
tio, the written declaration of a witness that was commonly taken into account in
court.Witnesses often wrote these statements in the third person and attested or
declared (testantur) that this or that had occurred.⁶⁰ The statements commonly
speak of obligations that have been discharged or contracts that have been
fulfilled.⁶¹ Acontius’ couplet is exactly this sort of witness-statement. The phrase
in eo scripta fuisse rata is a declaration that the message on the original apple
has been rendered legally valid.⁶² In this context, testatur means that Acontius
 There are several examples from Pompeii and Herculaneum; see Meyer () –.
 See Meyer () –.
 Note the prosaic in eo that conveys the dry style of legal transactions.
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certifies the message on the apple as authentic (see OLD s.v. testor 2b). A decep-
tive oath inscribed on a piece of fruit is treated as a legal document and the gold-
en likeness of this apple, the votive offering for the marriage’s fulfillment, au-
thenticates the legitimacy of the original message. In a genuinely Ovidian
manner, imitation validates deception.
The medium of witness-statements played a crucial role in court and it was
their physical form that made them authoritative. A testatio had to be written on
a tabula or tabella, while other forms of documents, such as letters and testimo-
nies on papyri, were an invitation to objections. As Meyer puts it, truth was em-
bodied in tabulae; the other forms of documents were bitterly contested
ground.⁶³ Given the importance of the physical form of legal statements, it is
worth examining the material on which Acontius’ statement is inscribed. His
first message is delivered via an apple, a potent symbol of enchantment and
temptation, but a medium that could hardly be authorized in a Roman court-
room. Yet the source of Acontius’ apple is Callimachus’ Aetia. Ovid’s causa acti-
vates the reference to Callimachus’ Aetia and imago is a marker of an intertextual
echo.⁶⁴ From an intertextual perspective, the story of Acontius and Cydippe is in-
scribed on and prescribed in the Aetia, a work in which the poet draws attention
to the fact (or the fiction) that he is writing on a δέλτος (fr. 1.21–2 Pf.), the Greek
equivalent to the Latin tabula. Callimachus brings up the material medium of his
poetry in the famous epiphany of Apollo in the prologue:⁶⁵
καὶ γὰρ ὅτ⌋ε πρ⌊ώ⌋τιστον ἐμοῖς ἐπὶ δέλτον ἔθηκα
γούνασι⌋ν, A᾿[πό]λλων εἶπεν ὅ μοι Λύκιος
Callimachus, Aetia fr. 1.21–2 Pf.
And when I first put a writing-tablet on my knees, Lycian Apollo told me
Ovid reworks this passage in the epiphany of Janus at the beginning of the Fasti
(haec ego cum sumptis agitare mente tabellis,/ lucidior uisa est, quam fuit ante,
domus. Fasti 1.93–4 ‘While I was pondering these after taking up my tablets, the
house looked brighter than it was before’). Ovid translates δέλτον as tabellis and
 Meyer () . On the importance of the physical form of the tabulae in legal statements,
see Meyer () –. Other forms of letters were also cited by advocates (especially in the
last century of the Republic), but their validity depended mostly on the authority of the sender.
 See Barchiesi ()  for causa in Heroides . as alluding to the Aetia as Ovid’s
model. For imago as intertextual echo, see Barchiesi () –; cf. Hinds () –.
 Callimachus mentions the writing-tablets of Xenomedes in the episode of Acontius and Cy-
dippe. The authoritative mythographer chronicled the history of Ceos in his δέλτοι (γέρων ἐνε-
θήκατο δέλτοις, fr. . Pf. ‘old Xenomedes recorded in his writing-tablets’). Callimachus’ writ-
ing-tablets reproduce the work of Xenomedes of old.
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marks his allusion to Callimachus with a subtle wordplay on Λύκιος-lucidior. In
the Fasti, a work whose very title is a legal term, Ovid becomes a scribe who
writes down the words of Janus. The Roman poet programmatically blends di-
vine inspiration with legal directions in a passage that replaces the Greek Apollo
of the Aetia with the distinctly Roman Janus.⁶⁶ If we take into account the impor-
tance of the Aetia in Heroides 20–21, we realize that Acontius’ imaginary inscrip-
tion works on two levels: within the fiction of the epistles, the hero refers to his
original message on the apple, but outside the fictional world, Ovid has Acontius
certify the authoritative text of Callimachus’ Aetia, a work written on a δέλτος/
tabula and thus carrying the significance of a legal statement. The cause that
binds Cydippe to her oath is to be found in Callimachus and Ovid turns the lit-
erary authority of the Aetia into legal evidence.
In the Heroides, fictional objects converge with intertextual realities. Yet the
division between wishful thinking and wish fulfillment is also crucial within the
framework of the mythological tale. Even within the fictional world the likeness
of the apple is merely a fantasy, yet its realization depends on Acontius marrying
Cydippe, a happy ending known to the reader, who can thus entertain the real-
ization of the golden apple by indulging in Acontius’ fantasy. Ovid’s readers can
venture to predict the mythological future because they are aware of the literary
past. At the same time, the daydream of a votive offering is flimsy if we consider
that it is a fanciful Ovidian innovation that has no basis in literary tradition. Ovid
likes to draw attention to his belatedness by simultaneously alluding to literary
traditions and inventing playful novelties. The future projection of another apple
is an imitation of and an innovation on Callimachus’ original.What is more, the
second apple is a comment on Ovid’s Heroides as texts composed after the Aetia.
Ovid’s epistle both imitates and updates Callimachus.
The materiality of messages inscribed on apples should be examined vis-à-
vis the writing-tablets of Callimachus and Ovid. Both poets mention the δέλτος/
tabella on which they are writing and Ovid mentions the tabellae of love letters
several times.⁶⁷ And once we suspend our disbelief and give credit to the mytho-
logical realities of Acontius’ letter, we realize that the hero’s imaginary authori-
zation of his original message is actually written on a tabella sealed with his sig-
nature. From that perspective, the medium and diction of his inscription look
more like a testatio and less like a fanciful reverie. It is also important to bear
in mind that witness-statements were ratified by being read aloud. The reader
 On law and etiology in the Fasti, see Gebhardt () –.
 See Amores .., , –, ..–, .., , .., ..; Ars Amatoria .,
., ; Metamorphoses ., –.
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embodied the voice of the witness and his or her recitation was a simultaneous
validation of the witness’ statement. Acontius wants to make Cydippe play this
role.⁶⁸ The hero has resorted to a similar trick in his apostrophe to Cydippe’s
fiancé. Acontius demands that the words of the contract be read and encourages
his rival to have Cydippe read them (recitetur formula pacti;/ neu falsam dicas
esse, fac ipsa legat. Heroides 20.151–2 ‘let us have the actual terms of the agree-
ment read out; and lest you say it is false, make her read them’). Kenney notes
that Acontius uses the language of an advocate in court demanding the produc-
tion of documents.⁶⁹ By reading aloud his message, Cydippe would declare
Acontius’ statement valid and she would once more fulfill his wishes. At the
end of his letter, Acontius attempts to deceive the heroine again with an inscrip-
tion, which would trick her into certifying his fantasies, and Ovid inventively re-
plays and Romanizes the Callimachean scenario.
The authorization of witness-statements depends both on textual materiality
and oral delivery. The myth of Acontius and Cydippe revolves around the contro-
versial idea that the heroine’s recitation validates the hero’s message and Ovid
repeatedly resorts to the realities of the Roman legal system in order to legitimize
his playful appropriation of a Greek myth.While reading is etymologically graft-
ed into Roman law, the erotic aspect of the author/reader relationship is essen-
tial to understanding Acontius’ success. According to Greco-Roman perceptions
of reception, the author penetrates the reader by means of a written message.⁷⁰
Reading aloud someone else’s words is how an author enters the body of a read-
er. This sexualization of recitation is the key to understanding how Acontius
manages to possess Cydippe by means of written words read aloud. As Cydippe
finishes the recitation of Acontius’ letter, she embodies the imaginary inscription
on a golden apple and thus she embodies the imaginary apple.
The heroine’s name puns on the Greek word for quince (Κυδώνιον μῆλον)
and Aristaenetus attests that Acontius deceived Cydippe with a Cydonian
apple (Aristaenetus 1.10.27 Vieillefond).⁷¹ Ovid relies on the Cydippe-κυδώνιον
wordplay in order to show that Acontius’ message collapses Cydippe’s identity
with that of the apple of temptation. In her epistle, the sick (or lovesick) heroine
compares her bloodless complexion with the pale color of the fruit (concidimus
macie, color est sine sanguine, qualem/ in pomo refero mente fuisse tuo, Heroides
 Cydippe tries to protect herself from the risk of reading Acontius’ words aloud and opens her
epistle by saying that she read his letter silently (Heroides .–). Ovid’s heroine does not
want to repeat the mistake of her Callimachean counterpart.
 Kenney () ad ..
 See Svenbro () –; Rosenmeyer () .
 See Rosenmeyer ()  n. ; Trumpf ().
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21.215– 16 ‘I am enfeebled with emaciation, my complexion is bloodless, just like
the color that, as I recall, was in your fruit’).⁷² The pallor of the fruit subtly but
clearly suggests that it is a pale quince, not a red apple.⁷³ The passionate mes-
sage transforms the woman’s complexion into the color of a quince and the ef-
fect of Acontius’ trick is that it assimilates Cydippe to the Cydonian apple; the
heroine turns into Acontius’ passion fruit.⁷⁴ While reading the projected inscrip-
tion of Heroides 20.239–40, Cydippe becomes an imitation of the votive apple, a
corporeal realization of a fictive image. The heroine’s delivery bears the fruit of
Acontius’ fantasy and her body becomes the medium of a message that symbol-
izes Acontius’ possession of herself. This is a fine example of Ovid’s favorite in-
terplay between the textual and sexual nature of love elegy’s object of desire.⁷⁵
An imaginary inscription on a Cydonian apple is materialized with the oral rec-
itation of a Cydonian heroine, an addition to the interchangeability between the
corpus of elegiac poetry and of elegiac puellae. Cydippe is the vocal embodiment
of Acontius’ passion.
The reception of Heroides 20 is further nuanced if we take into account that
Ovid likes to draw attention to the language and materiality of the letters in order
to highlight their fictionality. In Heroides 3.1–4, for instance, Briseis apologizes
for her broken Greek and the teary blots on her letter. We are invited to imagine
Achilles reading a foreign woman’s clumsy Greek in a letter littered with mis-
prints, but what Ovid’s readers actually face is the poet’s clear and fluent
Latin.⁷⁶ The involvement of the reader in the text (Achilles in Heroides 3 or Cy-
dippe in Heroides 20) should be distinguished from the experience of the reader
of the text (Ovid’s readership). From our perspective, a formal ratification of
 Cf. quam tibi nunc gracilem uix haec rescribere quamque/ pallida uix cubito membra leuare
puta! Heroides .– ‘how wasted away you must imagine her to be who can scarcely pen
this answer to you, how sallow the limbs that she can scarcely raise on one arm’ (transl. Ken-
ney). Ovid echoes Callimachus’ τὴν δ᾽ εἷλε κακὸς χλόος, fr. . Pf. ‘but evil pallor seized her’.
 Cf. palluit, ut…/…quaeque suos curuant matura Cydonia ramos (Procris) Ovid, Ars Amatoria
.– ‘She grew pale, just as ripe quinces which bend their own branches’.
 Cf. Cydippe’s forma noui talis marmoris esse solet, Heroides . ‘such as the usual appear-
ance of a new marble’, on which Alekou ()  comments: “un appariement original est
introduit qui dépasse celui esquissé par Acontius, lorsque la comparaison avec le marbre con-
firme la virtualité allégorique de la peinture. La mise en valeur du support d’épigrammes et du
matériau à sculpter transforme la figure en œuvre d’art. Toutefois, de la pomme au marbre, l’ob-
jet iconique se transforme jusqu’à ce qu’il s’identifie à la lettre en soi. L’inversion concerne autant
la figure que le texte, puisque le “ sujet ” syntaxique est en même temps l’objet iconique.” (My
emphasis).
 See Wyke (); ().
 See Ziogas () –. Similarly, Cydippe refers to her poor handwriting in Heroides
..
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Acontius’ tabula is nothing more than part of Ovid’s insubstantial poetics. In-
stead of conflating Greek myth with Roman reality, the anachronistic application
of the legal realities of the Romans to an ancient Greek myth ultimately stresses
the irreconcilable gap between the fictional world of Ovid’s characters and the
real world of his readers. Witness-statements, seals, and ratifications of author-
itative documents belong to the Roman legal system, but become immaterial
rhetoric at Ovid’s hands. Yet pure rhetoric is what matters above all in Latin
love elegy and the technicalities of the law are useful only if they serve the pur-
poses of elegiac persuasion and deception. In the end, hard evidence fades away
and illusion reasserts its power in matters of desire.
Libertine Love and Legal Limitations
Roman law and love elegy are brought together at the beginning of the Ars’ in-
uentio.The prologue of the Ars opens with an invitation to the reader to authorize
the praeceptor’s instructions, as we have seen above, and the first couplet of the
inuentio brings up issues of legal and amatory license:
dum licet et loris passim potes ire solutis,
elige cui dicas ‘tu mihi sola places.’
Ars Amatoria 1.41–2
While it is permitted and you can go everywhere on a loose rein, pick a girl and tell her:
‘you alone please me.’
Ovid’s dum licet implies the legal restrictions to the carefree period of amatory
pursuits. Emilio Pianezzola reads this couplet as drawing a distinction between
the frivolous love affairs of youth and the serious commitments of a more mature
age.⁷⁷ The license granted to young men’s playful affairs with prostitutes is coun-
terbalanced by grown-up-men’s legal obligations to marriage; the leisure of
youth gives way to the business of adult life. This transition from youthful play-
fulness to adult responsibilities is a defining characteristic of Roman comedy. In
Terence’s Adelphoe, for instance, the lenient senex Micio says that young men
should be allowed to have affairs with prostitutes (101– 10). The rationale is
that this license should be given to youth, so that inappropriate love affairs
do not occur at a more responsible age. Ideally, a young man will eventually
get fed up with prostitutes and devote himself to the good old Roman values.
 Pianezzola () XXIII and ad Ars Amatoria .–. For a similar approach, see Labate
() –.
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Even the censor Cato approved of a young Roman whom he saw coming out of a
brothel since sex with prostitutes protected Roman citizens from committing
adultery (see Hor. Satires 1.2.31–5). From that perspective, Ovid’s dum licet refers
to youthful extra-marital affairs with prostitutes, that is, affairs which do not
break adultery laws. As the slave Palinurus puts it: dum ted apstineas nupta,
uidua, uirgine, / iuuentute et pueris liberis, ama quidlubet (‘So long as you stay
away from the married woman, the widow, the maiden, the youth, and freeborn
boys, love whatever you fancy’ Plautus, Curculio 37–8). Young men should make
sure to choose eligible women for their playful loves.
In his Pro Caelio, Cicero employs similar rhetoric. Caelius is cast as an ado-
lescens from Roman comedy and Cicero reminds the jurors that license to playful
loves is traditionally granted to young men (Pro Caelio 48). Cicero appeals not
only to the licentia of his age but also to the customs and consent of the ances-
tors (maiorum consuetudine atque concessis, Pro Caelio 48) when it comes to
young men’s love affairs with meretrices and thus he makes sex with prostitutes
part of the mos maiorum. Ovid’s Ars Amatoria often gives the impression that it is
addressed to jurors⁷⁸ and at this point it echoes the rhetoric of the Pro Caelio. Cic-
ero’s licentia corresponds to Ovid’s dum licet and Cicero’s concessis parallels
Ovid’s concessaque furta (Ars Amatoria 1.33), the wittily subversive ‘legitimately
illegitimate affairs’ that forms part of the legal language of the programmatic
disclaimer.⁷⁹ Ovid seems to subscribe to a long tradition of Roman comedy
and rhetoric according to which it is lawfully permitted to young men to indulge
in affairs with prostitutes. Such frivolous liaisons ultimately protect the chastity
of Roman women and buttress traditional Roman morality.
This interpretation is certainly legitimate, but there is another way of reading
Ars 1.41–2, which renders the traditional concerns of Roman law and the Augu-
stan legislation irrelevant. Ovid’s focus here is not necessarily on young age in
general and its entitlement to playful love affairs in particular, but in a period
when a man has not lost his freedom due to love’s constraints. Freedom does
not follow the laws and customs of conventional Roman morality but is subject
to the constrictions of amorous passion. Hollis (1977: 41) points out that dum licet
implies that there might come a time when Ovid’s addressee is really in love and
no longer a free agent. In the world of Roman love elegy, Cupid enslaves the
lover and puts an end to his free will; freedom is something one enjoys before
 The disclaimers are the most prominent examples (e.g., Ars Amatoria .–, .–).
 See also the legal language in Seneca, Controuersiae .. (concessis aetati uoluptatibus
utor et iuuenali lege defungor; id facio quod pater meus fecit cum iuuenis esset. ‘I am enjoying
the playfulness granted to my age and taking advantage of the law for young men. I am
doing what my father did when he was young’).
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one falls in love.Within the generic framework of Roman love elegy, Hollis’ read-
ing makes sense, especially if we take into account another Ovidian couplet that
begins with dum licet:
dum licet, et modici tangunt praecordia motus,
si piget, in primo limine siste pedem.
Remedia Amoris 79–80
While it is permitted and moderate emotions touch your heart, even if it is unpleasant, stop
your step at the edge of the threshold.
Obviously, Ovid is not talking about the Roman legal system or the free rein
given to youthful liaisons with prostitutes. Instead, the poet refers to the first
symptoms of erotic desire. Not unlike a disease, love can be cured more easily
and efficiently at the start, before the infection spreads throughout the body
and the mind. Resist passion before it is too late and thus impossible to fight
back, advises the poet of the Remedia Amoris. The message of Ars 1.41–2 is sim-
ilar. Rational selection (elige) is possible at this early stage of looking for the
right woman. The first stage of a conscious and calculated choice of the appro-
priate object of desire will inevitably end once the lover is entangled in the nets
of monogamous obsession. The commitment of tu mihi sola places signals the be-
ginning of the end of a lover’s freedom. To be sure, such confession is conceited
and the beloved’s uniqueness is undermined by the banality of the statement.⁸⁰
In the Ars, the echo of the conventional statement of elegiac devotion is part of a
self-conscious strategy of seduction, not a sincere confession of true love.⁸¹ Yet
while the praeceptor urges his students to parrot a common tag of Latin love
elegy, there is always the danger that the man who plays the role of the lover
will actually fall in love (see Ars Amatoria 1.615– 16). Feigned love may become
real and, as an antidote to true passion, Ovid recommends that men should have
two or, if possible, more girlfriends (Remedia Amoris 441–2). Similarly, Lucretius
suggests that the festering obsession of a monogamous lover can be cured with
the wandering pleasures of a wandering Venus (De Rerum Natura 4.1068–78).
An exclusive desire for a single woman can be the source of suffering that
leads to loss of freedom. Ars 1.41–2 is appropriately framed by dum licet… ‘tu
 Ovid here quotes and encourages his students to repeat the elegiac lover’s conventional dec-
laration of faith to his exclusive beloved (see Prop. ..; [Tib.] ..).
 Ovid will later advise his students to seduce the maid before seducing the lady (Ars Amatoria
.–) and instruct them how to be successfully unfaithful to their girlfriends (Ars Amatoria
.–).
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mihi sola places’ since freedom of choice is lost once the lover devotes himself to
a single woman.
Ovid’s tu mihi sola places echoes a common elegiac dictum, but in a couplet
that brings up issues of love and legislation it further activates a specific refer-
ence to Propertius’ tu mihi sola places (2.7.19), which concludes a poem that cel-
ebrates the triumph of elegiac love over marriage legislation.⁸² Propertius begins
his poem by stating that Cynthia is happy because a law that threatened their
affair is now repealed.⁸³ In a twist of the elegiac recusatio, Propertius declares
that Caesar’s Jovian arms are mighty in war but have no power over love affairs
(2.7.3–6). The nature of Propertius’ love is above the law of Rome and his Roman
duty to father children. The confession of his exclusive love for Cynthia (tu mihi
sola places) emphasizes that the uniqueness of his affair defies social norms and
legal categorizations (e.g., marital, extra-marital, illicit, adulterous). Cynthia can
rejoice in Augustus’ repeal of a marriage law, but Propertius reminds us that im-
perial legislation has no power over true love anyway. Cynthia alone pleases the
poet and sola pits the elegiac puella not only against other women but also
against the Augustan ideals of fighting battles and fathering children for
Rome.⁸⁴ Ovid’s Propertian echo in Ars 1.42 reminds his readers that the love
for a special woman matters more than anything else and that the shackles of
elegiac passion are stronger than any legal constrictions.
In sum, there are two ways of reading Ars 1.41–2: one is concerned with
Roman law, while the other refers to the laws of elegiac passion. Both of these
readings deal with time and timing: the former refers to a transition from the fri-
volities of youth to the serious responsibilities of adulthood, while the latter re-
fers to a transition from the playful affairs of a libertine to the dire constraints of
monogamous passion. Both interpretations are valid and both should be taken
into account, but it should be noted that they can hardly co-exist. In Freudian
terms, this is a case of Kompromissbildung, a semiotic manifestation which
makes room, simultaneously, for two opposite meanings, which stand in an ir-
 On Propertius’ stance at Augustus’ marriage law in this poem, see Cairns (); Stahl
() –; Gale () –.
 We do not know much about the legislation and its contents, and reconstructing the law
from Propertius’ elegy is an unreliable method. On this issue, see Cairns (); Stahl ()
–. Badian () argues that this was not Augustus’ law but an old law repealed by Oc-
tavian in  BCE along with other Triumviral measures. He speculates that the repealed law
was about taxation of bachelors. Badian’s theory is not supported by Propertius’ text, or actually
by any other evidence, and unsurprisingly did not find many followers; see Treggiari () –
.
 Cf. Rothstein () ad loc.; Stahl () –.
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reconcilable relationship to one another.⁸⁵ The reader needs to choose one and
when Ovid makes readers choose, he prompts them to make a political decision.
This is an example of what Frederick Ahl calls “the art of safe criticism”:⁸⁶ Ovid
forces the reader to “find the points for himself and suppose the judgment he
passes is his own, not one suggested by the writer.”⁸⁷ The poet tries to protect
himself by remaining noncommittal, while triggering a disclosure of his readers’
biases and political affiliations.
We can choose to interpret the couplet as Ovid’s subscribing to conventional
morality and validating Augustus’ adultery laws, but we cannot ignore that an
alternative reading trumps traditional Roman mores. Whatever we choose, our
choice would probably reveal more about ourselves and less about Ovid’s inten-
tions. Ovid’s text is a mirror that reflects our own prejudices. And this is precisely
what objective critics fear the most. Scholars sometimes argue that a single in-
terpretation is objectively the correct one or more often try to resist commitment
to a single reading and have it both ways. It is part of the scholarly style to as-
sume a detached and disinterested pose, but it is a characteristic of a passionate
reader to commit to one reading. Admittedly, Ovid expects his readers to be both
disinterested and passionate, but, like the elegiac lover’s sober reasoning, dis-
passionate judgment fades away once we dedicate ourselves to Ovid’s poetry
and let his charm seduce us. Shedding all pretensions of critical impartiality, I
confess that I prefer to read Ovid as undermining Augustan legislation. Passion
has its own rules and its power exceeds moral and social norms. Once erotic de-
sire incapacitates free choice and rational decision, there is little room for heed-
ing legal restrictions. Overall, the Ars Amatoria replaces moral for aesthetic
criteria⁸⁸ and makes desirability rather than eligibility the main characteristic
of the beloved. It is legitimate to argue that in Ovid the law of love annuls the
law of Rome.
Concluding Remarks
Personal passion is the foundation of elegiac love, while family and public duty
dictate the terms of marriage contracts. But the fantasies of Latin love elegy and
the realities of Roman marriage laws can hardly be reconciled.We can attempt to
 See Casali ()  for Kompromissbildung in the Aeneid.
 Ahl ().
 Ahl () . Ovid draws attention to the open-ended nature of reception in his letter to
Augustus (Tristia ); see Gibson ().
 See Gibson () –, –, –; ().
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harmonize elegiac ideals with Roman legislation by positing a distinction be-
tween elegiac love as youthful, frivolous, and extra-marital but permitted on
the one hand, and marriage as befitting a mature and responsible age aware
of a man’s duty to his fatherland on the other. Yet elegy’s claims about Amor’s
universal dominion seriously undermine neat categorizations that would but-
tress Roman morality. True passion knows no social, moral or legal limits and
Amor’s agenda is as imperialistic and ambitious as Augustus’. The tension be-
tween elegiac love and marriage is only exacerbated with Augustus’ marriage
legislations which break the boundaries between personal and public affairs.⁸⁹
As a pater patriae Augustus sees Rome as his own family and his rule leaves
no space for unregulated affairs. By contrast, love elegy creates and validates
a legal code that utterly confounds the branding of relationships as marital,
extra-marital, and adulterous. In this generic framework, laws and legislations
are subjected to the rules of erotic deception. Love conquers everything, the
Roman law included.
Bibliography
Ahl, F. 1984. “The Art of Safe Criticism in Greece and Rome”, AJPh 105: 174–208.
Alekou, S. 2011. La représentation de la femme dans les Héroïdes d’Ovide. (Dissertation,
Sorbonne). Paris.
Allen, D. 2000. The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Ancient Athens.
Princeton, NJ.
Anderson, W.S. 1989. “Lycaon: Ovid’s Deceptive Paradigm in Metamorphoses 1”, ICS 14:
91–101.
Badian, E. 1985. “A Phantom Marriage Law”, Philologus 129: 82–98.
Bankowski, Z. 2001. Living Lawfully: Love in Law and Law in Love. Dordrecht/London.
Barchiesi, A. 1993. “Future Reflexive: Two Modes of Allusion and Ovid’s Heroides”, HSPh 95:
333–65.
— 2001. Speaking Volumes. Narrative and Intertext in Ovid and Other Latin Poets. London.
Barchiesi, A. and P. Hardie. 2010. “The Ovidian Career Model: Ovid, Gallus, Apuleius,
Boccaccio”, in: P. Hardie and H. Moore (eds.), Classical Literary Careers and their
Reception. Cambridge, 59–88.
Cairns, F. 1979. “Propertius on Augustus’ Marriage Law”, GB 8: 185–204.
Casali, S. 2004. “Nisus and Euryalus: Exploiting the Contradictions in Virgil’s ‘Doloneia’”,
HSPh 102: 319–54.
Crawford, M.H. 1996. Roman Statutes. BICS, supplement 64. London.
Davis, P. 2006. Ovid and Augustus. A Political Reading of Ovid’s Erotic Poems. London.
 On Augustus’ marriage laws and the obliteration of the distinction between private and pub-
lic, see Raditsa () –, –, –.
Love Elegy and Legal Language in Ovid 237
Drinkwater, M. 2013. “Militia amoris: Fighting in Love’s Army”, in: T. Thorsen (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Latin Love Elegy. Cambridge, 194–206.
Dyck, A. 2013. Cicero: Pro Marco Caelio. Cambridge.
Farrell, J. 2002. “Greek Lives and Roman Careers in the Classical Vita Tradition”, in: P.
Cheney and F.A. de Armas (eds.), European Literary Careers: The Author from Antiquity
to the Renaissance. Toronto, 24–46.
— 2004. “Ovid’s Virgilian Career”, MD 52: 41–55.
Fear, T. 2000. “The Poet as Pimp: Elegiac Seduction in the Time of Augustus”, Arethusa 33:
217–40.
Feldherr, A. 2002. “Metamorphosis in the Metamorphoses”, in: P. Hardie (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Ovid. Cambridge, 163–79.
— 2010. Playing Gods. Ovid’s Metamorphoses and the Politics of Fiction. Princeton, NJ.
Gale, M. 1997. “Propertius 2.7: Militia Amoris and the Ironies of Elegy”, JRS 87: 77–91.
Gebhardt, U. 2009. Sermo Iuris: Rechtssprache und Recht in der augusteischen Dichtung.
Leiden.
Geffcken, K.A. 1973. Comedy in the Pro Caelio. Leiden.
Gibson, B. 1999. “Ovid on Reading: Reading Ovid. Reception in Ovid Tristia II”, JRS 89:
19–37.
Gibson, R. 2003. Ovid: Ars Amatoria Book 3. Edited with Introduction and Commentary.
Cambridge.
— 2006. “Ovid, Augustus, and the Politics of Moderation in Ars Amatoria 3”, in: R. Gibson,
S. Green, and A. Sharrock (eds.), The Art of Love: Bimillennial Essays on Ovid’s Ars
Amatoria and Remedia Amoris. Oxford, 121–42.
— 2007. Excess and Restraint. Propertius, Horace, and Ovid’s Ars Amatoria. London.
Goodrich, P. 1997. “Epistolary Justice: The Love Letter as Law”, Yale Journal of Law and the
Humanities 9: 245–95.
— 2006. The Laws of Love. A Brief Historical and Practical Manual. New York.
Habinek, T. 2005. The World of Roman Song. Baltimore, MD.
Hardie, P. 1997. “Questions of Authority: The Invention of Tradition in Ovid, Metamorphoses
15”, in: T. Habinek and A. Schiesaro (eds.), The Roman Cultural Revolution. Cambridge,
182–98.
— 2002. Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion. Cambridge.
Hinds, S. 1998. Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry.
Cambridge.
Hollis, A.S. 1977. Ovid. Ars Amatoria Book I. Oxford.
Kenney, E.J. 1969. “Ovid and the Law”, YClS 21: 241–63.
— 1970. “Love and Legalism: Ovid, Heroides 20 and 21”, Arion 9: 388–414.
— 1996. Ovid: Heroides XVI-XXI. Cambridge.
Kirfel, E.-A. 1969. Untersuchungen zur Briefform der Heroides Ovids. Bern/Stuttgart.
Labate, M. 1984. L’arte di farsi amare. Modelli culturali e progetto didascalico nell’elegia
ovidiana. Pisa.
Lausberg, H. 1998. Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study (trans. M.T.
Bliss and A. Jansen, ed. D.E. Orton and R.D. Anderson). Leiden.
Leigh, M. 2004. “The Pro Caelio and Comedy”, CPh 99: 300–35.
Littlewood, A.R. 1967. “The Symbolism of the Apple in Greek and Roman Literature”, HSPh
72: 147–81.
238 Ioannis Ziogas
Lowrie, M. 2009. Writing, Performance, and Authority in Augustan Rome. Oxford.
Magdelain, A. 1978. La loi à Rome: histoire d’un concept. Paris.
McGinn, T. 1998. Prostitution, Sexuality, and the Law in Ancient Rome. Oxford.
McGowan, M. 2009. Ovid in Exile: Power and Poetic Redress in the Tristia and Epistulae ex
Ponto. Leiden/Boston, MA.
McKeown, J. 1989. Ovid: Amores. Volume II. A Commentary on Book One. Leeds.
Meyer, E. 2004. Legitimacy and Law in the Roman World: Tabulae in Roman Belief and
Practice. Oxford.
Morgan, L. 2003. “Child’s Play. Ovid and his Critics”, JRS 93: 66–91.
Pianezzola, E. 1991 (ed.). Ovidio, L’ Arte di Amare a cura di E. Pianezzola. Commento di G.
Baldo, L. Cristante, E. Pianezzola. Milan.
Pierre, M. 2008. La poétique du carmen: Étude d’une énonciation romaine des Douze Tables
à l’époque d’Auguste. (Dissertation). Paris.
Putnam, M. 2000. Horace’s Carmen Saeculare: Ritual Magic and the Poet’s Art. New Haven,
CT/London.
Raditsa, L.F. 1980. “Augustus’ Legislation Concerning Marriage, Procreation, Love Affairs and
Adultery”, ANRW 2.13: 278–339.
Rimell, V. 2006. Ovid’s Lovers: Desire, Difference, and the Poetic Imagination. Cambridge.
Rosenmeyer, P. 1996. “Love Letters in Callimachus, Ovid and Aristaenetus or the Sad Fate of
a Mailorder Bride”, MD 36: 9–31.
Rothstein, M. 1966. Die Elegien des Sextus Propertius (3rd ed.) 2 vols. Dublin.
Sharrock, A. 2006. “Ovid and the Politics of Reading”, in: P. Knox (ed.), Oxford Readings in
Classical Studies: Ovid. Oxford, 238–61 (=MD 33 (1994): 97–122).
Stahl, H.P. 1985. Propertius: ‘Love’ and ‘War’: Individual and State under Augustus. Berkeley,
CA.
Svenbro, J. 1993. Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece (trans. J. Lloyd).
Ithaca, NY (orig. publ. 1988).
Treggiari, S. 1991. Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time of
Ulpian. Oxford.
Trumpf, J. 1960. “Kydonische Äpfel”, Hermes 88: 14–22.
Videau, A. 2004. “L’écriture juridique d’Ovide des élégies amoureuses (Amours et Héroïdes)
aux Tristes de l’exil”, Ars Scribendi 2 (Published online).
— 2010. La poétique d’Ovide, de l’élégie à l’épopée des Métamorphoses: Essai sur un style
dans l’Histoire. Paris.
Wallace-Hadrill, A. 1985. “Propaganda and Dissent? Augustan Moral Legislation and the Love
Poets”, Klio 67: 180–4.
Watson, A. 1995. The Spirit of Roman Law. Athens, GA/London.
Wyke, M. 2006. “Reading Female Flesh: Amores 3.1”, in: P. Knox (ed.), Oxford Readings in
Classical Studies: Ovid. Oxford, 169–204 (= A. Cameron 1989 (ed.), History as Text: The
Writing of Ancient History. London, 113–43).
— 2002. The Roman Mistress. Oxford.
Ziogas, I. 2011. “The Myth is Out There: Reality and Fiction at Tomis (David Malouf’s An
Imaginary Life)”, in: J. Ingleheart (ed.), Two Thousand Years of Solitude: Exile after Ovid.
Oxford, 289–305.
Love Elegy and Legal Language in Ovid 239

